Patient Confidentiality in Scotland: an overview by Muir, Rod
  21
st
  April 2004 
Patient Confidentiality in Scotland: an overview 
Dr Rod Muir 
 
Background 
1. The use and security of personal health data has received a great deal of 
attention in recent years as a result of several factors.  These include increasing 
computerisation and networking of health information systems; changes to 
data protection law and professional guidance; and concerns about emerging 
public health issues such as HIV/AIDS and disease registers.   
2. It is of vital importance to patients that their health data are kept secure and 
NHSScotland now puts considerable effort into systems designed to achieve 
this.  It is also important, however, that those caring for patients should have 
access to the information they need in order to provide care.   
The drivers and the need to achieve a balance 
3. NHSScotland (NHSS) and health services elsewhere have been engaged in 
debate over how best to achieve an optimum balance between individual 
privacy and sharing the information needed to provide ‘seamless’ care, 
measure quality, improve safety and plan and administer services (1).   
4. The need for more data has been driven by consumer demand for better 
outcomes; by new inspection arrangements designed to increase accountability 
and by the desire of health planners to improve management efficiency and 
reduce waste.  Consumers of health care have been encouraged to demand 
high standards and to know their rights, including their rights with respect to 
their information.  The public are thought to know little about the ways in 
which their health data are used. (2).  They may have anxieties about this 
information being passed on for surveillance, for marketing, insurance, 
commercial or research purposes, although little research has been done on 
this in the UK. 
Data Handling in NHSScotland 
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5. Large volumes of information are collected and held by the organisations 
making up NHSScotland.  Hospitals, general practices, chemists, community 
care services and others gather and use information on patient contacts; 
diagnosis; procedures; drug treatments and so on in order to manage individual 
care; to track and monitor activity and assess the outcomes and quality of care 
and plan services.  Most of the information used originates in individual 
person-based data.  When used for planning or studying outcomes it is 
commonly ‘anonymised’ either by aggregation or by removal of obvious 
identifiers such as name and address in order to protect privacy but this not 
uniform and standards are just beginning to be agreed and applied.  
6. Two organisations in NHSScotland are responsible for collating and holding 
large volumes of health-related data on individuals: the Information and 
Statistics Division (ISD), part of NHSScotland, and the General Register 
Office for Scotland (GROS).  ISD gathers data from hospitals, general 
practices and other health care providers in order to provide national level 
comparative data and works with clinicians, policy makers and managers to 
provide the data they need for audit, quality improvement and operational 
management of health services.  GROS is concerned primarily with the 
collation of data from the census and on deaths and other vital events.  ISD 
and GROS exchange data e.g. on populations in order to calculate rates or to 
assess population shifts.  Data are also provided to bona fide researchers by 
both organisations under closely scrutinised conditions.   
7. The boundary between research, operational management and audit is often 
difficult to distinguish and both ISD and GROS rely on the advice of a Privacy 
Advisory Committee (PAC) in matters of this kind.  This is of some 
importance as guidance from the Information Commissioner, from The 
Confidentiality and Security Advisory Group for Scotland (CSAGS) and from 
the General Medical Council (GMC) distinguishes between these uses of data 
and the kind of consent which each requires.   
8. PAC is an informal advisory group with a predominantly non ‘health’ 
membership.  Its status as such is under debate.  Whilst it has been invaluable 
in providing guidance and independent scrutiny it is felt it needs to be more 
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accountable and visible and change status to meet the current standards for a 
public body.  (see after)   
Increased complexity – new possibilities and new anxieties 
9. The complexity of information systems has increased rapidly in the past two 
decades.  Networks of linked computers now collect, hold, analyse and 
transmit large amounts of personal information; electronic databases and 
registers are commonplace and play an important part in running health 
services; ‘virtual’ databases can exist within larger data sets, potentially 
subverting the rules on the use of registers; and datasets can be and are being 
linked electronically to create new knowledge.  The benefits and risks of these 
activities are often hard to quantify.  The relative values involved are often a 
question of perspective and the interests and rights of the individual may 
appear to be at odds with those of the larger social group.  Whilst those in the 
field are aware of the need to inform the data subjects of the ways in which 
their data are used there has been little public discussion of the benefits and 
risks associated with this kind of data processing.  This is familiar territory to 
those in the public health field and the current debate about the costs and 
benefits of vaccination are a good example of the difficulties involved in 
having a public debate about such an emotive topic. 
Current approaches to maintaining confidentiality 
10. NHSScotland has developed a number of systems for responding to legal and 
professional requirements on maintaining patient confidentiality.  The main 
imperatives are the Data Protection Act 1998, the Common Law and current 
professional guidance, particularly that of the General Medical Council.   
11. All NHS organisations have appointed a senior professional to be responsible 
for patient confidentiality, a ‘Caldicott Guardian’ (from the recommendations 
of the Caldicott Committee set up to advise on patient data handling in the 
NHS) whose role is to audit practice, manage an annual improvement plan and 
develop protocols for information sharing.  This individual is a senior 
professional with access at board level who is there to ensure patient 
confidentiality is taken seriously at this level.   
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12. Organisations handling personal data must have a notification with the 
Information Commissioner which sets out what data they can process and for 
what purposes and these organisations are required to have a Data Protection 
Officer to assist in compliance.   
13. Additionally, since organisations now depend heavily on IT systems to 
manage their data, many have appointed IT security officers.   
14. Records managers also play an additional, important role in controlling access 
to patient records.    
15. The chief executives of organisations failing to comply with the DPA98 risk 
being fined and imprisoned.  Doctors and nurses failing to comply with 
professional advice on privacy issued by the General Medical Council (GMC) 
or the United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health 
Visiting (UKCCNM) may have their right to practice removed. 
16. Research uses of data are scrutinised in the United Kingdom by Research 
Ethics committees whose members are aware of data protection and privacy 
requirements, although this is not specifically part of their training and remit.   
17. In Scotland the Privacy Advisory Committee (PAC) has been in existence for 
ten years to advise ISD and GROS on the use and release of personal health 
information.  This was in recognition of the large volumes of personal 
information held by these bodies and the need for independent scrutiny of their 
stewardship of personal health data.   
18. There is, however, currently no body in Scotland with the role of providing 
advice at national level on these issues and, when questions arise over 
interpretation of the law or professional guidance, the decision is ultimately 
one for the individual concerned.  He or she must weigh the pros and cons of 
using or sharing the information in question and be prepared to justify this if 
challenged – a position which can be uncomfortable and one for which many 
doctors and nurses feel ill prepared.  This may be inevitable given the current 
legal and professional regulations.  The Scottish Executive Health Department 
is responsible for health policy and does provide advice and guidance on 
confidentiality from time to time.   
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Recent developments 
Confidentiality and Security Advisory Group for Scotland (CSAGS). 
19. CSAGS was set up in September 2000 as an independent committee, 
supported by the Scottish Executive Health Department (SEHD), to provide 
advice on the confidentiality and security of health related information to the 
Scottish Executive, the public and health care professionals.  CSAGS 
reviewed the way the healthcare community in Scotland uses the information it 
collects from patients and reported in April 2002.  CSAGS advised that 
changes in practice and culture were necessary if NHSScotland was to meet 
legal and ethical obligations to patients when using their health data.  It 
concluded that patients knew little about the ways in which their data were 
used by the health services but also acknowledged that the future health of the 
population requires continuing access to this data.   
20. CSAGS recommended that patients should be better informed as to how their 
data were used by NHSScotland and that much more extensive use of 
anonymisation and other privacy enhancing technologies should be made.  The 
Scottish Executive was advised to promote training and an implementation 
strategy for all levels of NHSScotland.  CSAGS recommended against new 
legislation permitting the processing of health data.  This was to remain as a 
contingency. 
21. The implementation of CSAGS recommendations has created a considerable 
work programme in Scotland that is likely to increase the demand on Caldicott 
Guardians and others involved in information security.  
Scottish Executive Health Department Response to CSAGS 
1. The Scottish Executive Health Department (SEHD) outlined its response to 
the CSAGS recommendations in August 2003 setting out a work programme 
to “promote best practice and continued improvement in the use of personal 
health information as an integral part of patient care.” (3) It retains the 
responsibility for standards of patient confidentiality within the framework of 
clinical and staff governance and clinical risk; “recognises and supports” 
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Caldicott Guardians as leaders for this “challenging agenda” and sets out 
milestones to progress and priority tasks against which progress is to be 
reviewed in April 2004.  It emphasises the need to inform staff, patients and 
the public, and to seek appropriate consent for the use of data.   
2. At the same time a new Code of Practice for NHSScotland on Protecting 
Patient Confidentiality has now been introduced (4); local patient information 
leaflets on protection of personal health information are being issued by NHS 
Boards and Trusts and NHS organisations are asked to use anonymised 
national data where appropriate and to set up systems to similar standards for 
local data flows.  The SEHD also called for a review of staffing and support 
for Data Protection and Records Management.   
 
Some current areas of difficulty 
Disease registers 
3. A register is, at its simplest, a set of organised information that is kept up over 
time.  The means of storing the information will range from paper (e.g. index 
cards or a book) to computerised databases; their size will vary from a few to 
millions of records and they may be kept by, or for, individuals, groups of 
individuals or organisations.  Their status will vary from small and informal to 
large and officially recognized.  Some have a legal basis e.g. Census data but 
most do not. 
4. The original written type of register is now being replaced by computerised 
systems and this has fundamentally changed their nature.  For example the 
data included can be analysed more quickly and in more sophisticated ways.  
Also now a ‘register’ of individuals sharing common features can exist in 
‘virtual’ form as an easily accessible subset of a larger collection of data 
collected for a wider purpose.  The actual location of the data is now relatively 
unimportant; what matters is who controls the data and who has access to it.  
A population database can be held on a computer in Dundee but be accessed 
and managed by staff in Edinburgh.  Data in one register may be linked to data 
in other registers. An example of this is the linkage of National Health 
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Services Central Register to Vital Events data, to the Community Health Index 
and to the Cancer Registry.   
5. Registers have a number of uses in health and social care (5): preventive 
medicine; genetic counselling; follow up and treatment; population registers; 
at risk registers.  Some are disease specific, some person specific and some 
function specific.   
6. In order to be useful the data collected needs to be accurate and valid. For 
some purposes completeness of data is important (e.g. for immunisation 
programmes or determining disease incidence and prevalence) Registers need 
therefore to be administered and maintained.  The problems this presents vary 
with the size and complexity of the data, and its intended use.  Clear 
definitions and inclusion criteria are required, quality assurance systems are 
needed if data quality is to be maintained and the reasons for collecting the 
data need to be clear and the uses of the data need to be justified.  This clearly 
presents challenges for those maintaining registers. 
7. There are a number of ways in which good practice could be developed and 
ensured e.g. through education: standards; enforcement and inspection; audit, 
quality assurance and professional accreditation. All are likely to be either 
costly or bureaucratic, or both.   This clearly should be part of a wider 
approach to governance of information use. 
Consent, informing and opt out 
8. Inadequate and confused guidance over these issues causes uncertainty for 
those processing personal data.   
9. In the case of consent, data processors are often informed that consent ‘must 
always be obtained’ but guidance commonly fails to make it sufficiently clear 
that consent may be implied in many circumstances e.g. when data are being 
processed for operational management of a service carrying out legitimate 
functions.  This is a potential criticism of the current guidance from the 
General Medical Council, which is set out in terms that many doctors find 
threatening.  (This has recently been revised and issued with a set of  
“frequently asked questions”)   
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10. As regards information giving, it is now more widely appreciated that data 
subjects must be advised that their data are being processed if processing is to 
be fair and legal.  Health services are now working to conform to this.  
However there is little clarity as to what level of information is required, or 
how it should be provided.  The Information Commissioner is likely to require 
only that organisations are making a reasonable attempt to improve 
information giving over a realistic time period but the lack of guidance on 
standards leaves room for uncertainty. 
11. Lastly, guidance commonly gives the impression that those patients who do 
not wish to have their data processed have an automatic right to prevent this.  
However, the Data Protection Act 1998 states (Section 10) that an individual is 
entitled to require a data controller not to process any personal data in respect 
of which he is the data subject only for specified reasons:-  
(a) the processing of those data or their processing for that purpose or in that 
manner is causing or is likely to cause substantial damage or substantial 
distress to him or to another, and (b) that damage or distress is or would be 
unwarranted.   
12. As Lowrance (6) has pointed, the right to privacy is not absolute.  “The Data 
Protection Act ensures that data-subjects have a right to inspect data about 
themselves, which contributes to patient-centering of care. But although it may 
give the patient a photocopy or printout, or correct an error or insert an 
amendment at a patient’s request, for a variety of medical and legal reasons no 
health provider… can relinquish possession of, or right of control over, data it 
has collected in providing or paying for care.”  
13. If this were more widely appreciated it would avoid some of the confusion 
and uncertainty surrounding data processing. 
Anonymisation    
14. CSAGS proposed that all data used for secondary purposes should be 
‘anonymised’.  The attraction of this approach is that, in theory, once data are 
anonymised they are no longer regarded as personal data (i.e. identified with a 
living individual) However, although CSAGS proposed that the removal of 
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name, address, full post-code and full date of birth would constitute 
‘acceptable anonymisation’ for most purposes, there is as yet no generally 
accepted definition of ‘anonymisation’ or ‘acceptable anonymisation’.  
15. In practice neither individual data items nor data sets can be neatly 
categorised as either person (or patient) identifying or anonymous.  Single data 
items reveal little, although some identifiers are regarded as more obviously 
identifying than others, particularly name, address, full date of birth and full 
postcode.   
16. Multiple data items or datasets, on the other hand, present greater or lesser 
risk of identifying individuals depending on the data items they contain and 
the context.  Some data sets clearly carry a high risk of identifying individuals, 
especially if they contain any of the more obviously identifying fields listed 
above, whilst some present little risk.  A continuum of risk exists between 
these extremes and it is often difficult to know where a given set of data lies 
on this risk spectrum.  Consequently, those involved in handling patient data 
need to exercise skill and judgment and they require robust systems and 
useable pragmatic guidelines.   
17. ‘Anonymisation’ is a complex set of processes made up of people and systems 
and involving data transmission, data holding and data access controls.  Even 
after obvious identifying data items such as name, address, full postcode and 
date of birth are removed from data sets the risk of ‘indirect’ identification of 
individuals remains and even such partly ‘anonymised’ data have to be 
handled securely.  The challenge is to balance the risk of using the data against 
the benefits to the patient or the care ‘system’ of using them e.g. in efforts to 
improve the quality of care.  The processes and systems on which all this relies 
need constant scrutiny and improvement if they are to work effectively.   
Conclusion 
18. The debate over the use and safeguarding of personal health information goes 
on; the issues are complex, but there are signs of a consensus emerging in 
some areas (1).  However in others doubts remain: e.g. over the clarity of 
professional guidance and how to achieve consensus over its interpretation; 
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how to inform patients and what to tell them; how to regulate disease and 
other registers; whether it is possible to ‘anonymise’ data in ways which retain 
their usefulness.   
19. The current arrangements in Scotland have grown up in response to what 
often seems to those involved to be a forest of regulations with only occasional 
clearings of common sense.  Some pathways through this are emerging.  Those 
responsible for exploring them are keen to have the issues debated more 
widely and to have help with seeing more of the wood and less of the trees.  
References 
(1) Chalmers, J, Muir R.  Patient privacy and confidentiality.  BMJ 2003;326:725 -6 
(2) Confidentiality and Security Advisory Group for Scotland.  Protecting Patient 
Confidentiality-final report.  Edinburgh: Scottish Executive Health Department 
2002 
(3) The Use of Personal Health Information In NHSScotland To Support Patient 
Care.  Edinburgh: Scottish Executive Health Department, 2003 
(4) NHS Code of Practice on Protecting Patient Confidentiality.  Edinburgh: Scottish 
Executive Health Department 2003 (www.show.scot.nhs.uk/confidentiality ) 
(5) Weddel JM.  Registers and Registries: A Review.  Int J Epidemiol 1973; 2 (3): 
2218 
(6) Lowrance WW.  Learning from experience: privacy and the secondary use of data 
in health research.  London; Nuffield Trust 2002 
